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388 IN RE BANDMANN [51 C.2d 
No. 6305. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1958.] 
In rc CHARLES BANDMANN, ,JR. on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Criminal Law-Judgment-Indeterminate Sentence.-An inde-
terminate sentence is in effect a sentence for the maxi-
mum term. 
[2] Abortion-Attempt to Commit Abortion-Punishment.-Under 
Pen. § 274, providing that the substantive offense of 
abortion is punishable imprisonment in the state prison 
"not less than two nor more than five years," the maximum 
sentence for abortion is five years, and the punishment for 
an attempt to commit abortion would be two and a half years 
under Pen. Code, § 664, subd. 1, providing for punishment for 
an attempt to commit a substantive crime, punishable by im-
prisonment in the state prison "for five years, or more," at 
half the maximum punishment prescribed for the crime itself. 
[3] Statutes-Construction-Aids-Title of Act.-The title of a 
statute may be relied on in ascertaining the intention of the 
Legislature, where the statute is itself ambiguous, but the 
title cannot be used for the purpose of restraining or con-
any positive statutory provision. 
[ 4] Criminal Law-Punishment-Extent and Duration-Attempts. 
-The editorial title of Pen. Code, § 664, subd. 1, must be dis-
regarded since its provisions are unambiguous and plainly state 
that if the offense attempted is punishable by imprisonment in 
§ 
the state "for five years or more" the person guilty of 
such attempt is by imprisonment in the state prison 
or in a county as the case may be, for a term not exceeding 
half the longest term of imprisonment prescribed on a con-
viction of the offense attempted, whe.reas subd. 2 of such eode 
section makes provision for punishment of those guilty of 
attempts to commit crimes where the substantive offense is 
punishable in the state prison "for any term less than five 
" The Legislature intended that a crime carrying a 
maximum sentence should constitute the dividing line 
between the two subdivisions. 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 277; Am.Jur., Criminal Law, 
See Am.Jur., § 310. 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal 
Law,§ 518. 
§ 271; Am.Jur., Criminal 
1\icK. Dig. References: Criminal Law, § 1020; [2, 8] Abor-
§ 1..5; Statutes, [4, 5, 9-12] Criminal Law, § 1481; 
[6] Statutes, J64(1); [7] Statutes,§ 164(2); [13] Habeas Corpus, 
§ 34; Prisons, § 15; [15] Habeas Corpus, §59. 
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C.2d 388; 333 P.2d 
[5] !d.-Punishment--Extent and Duration-Attempts.~-In 
§ 
to 
to tho plain ;md 
2 arc eonsistPnt nnd harmonious. 
[6a, 6b] Statutes-Construction-As a Whole--Harmonizing Parts. 
-A statute must be read and eonsidcred a whole to 
mine the true intention; all parts of a statute must 
be construed and so far 11~ it is 
to do so without doing violf:nee to the or 
and purpose of the statute, so that it nwy in its entirety. 
[7] Id.-Construction-Reconcilement of Inconsistent Provisions. 
-In cases of eonfiict between 
those susceptible o[ nnly one 
susceptible of' two if the statute 
monious. 
(8] Abortion- Attempt to Commit Abortion- Punishment. ---In 
view of the clear wording found in the of Pen. 
~ 664, subds. 1, 2, relating to attempts to 
commit erirne, subd. 2, pro>•iding for a county sentence 
for not more than one year if the offense be pun-
ishable by imprisonment in the state prison :my tel'Ul 
less than five years," does not require a construction that it is 
applicable to an attempt to commit abortion. 
[9] Criminal Law-Punishment-Extent and Duration-Attempts. 
-The words "nor more than five years" in Pen. Code, § 
relating to punishment for be con-
strued to mean that the term cannot 
(Disnpproving dietum in l':.r parir Ho];r, 3D C;;L 42a. 
concerning punishment for second degree 
[10] !d.-Punishment--Extent and Duration-Attempts.-- l:Jnder 
Pen. Code, § 664, rdating to punishment for 
mit erime, it is the maximum term of the 
not half the sentence for the substantive 
g·uide in determining the punishment for an attempt to commit 
the substantive offense. (Disapproving any intimation to the 
contrary in In ;·e Belli~, 75 CaLipp. J JA7 [241 P. 910], and 
People v. Snow, 123 Cnl.App. ;n, :35 [10 P.2d .) 
[11] !d.-Punishment-Extent and Duration-Attempts.- Pen. 
Code, § 664, relating to punishment for attempts to commit 
crime, does not deny a prisoner due process of law and ('([lWl 
protection of the la\\' because of "n1gurucss;' since by con-
sidering and construing its two subdivisions together the 
language used is neither vague nor ambiguous. 
[12] !d.-Punishment-Extent and Duration-Attempts.-Even if 
Pen. Code, § 664, relating to punishment for attempts to 
commit crime, has been misconstrued and misapplied in the 
eonstl'uetively a 
nnJ control of the 
PROCEEDING m habeas corpus to secure release from 
"'Writ denied and remanded. 
Ruth Lubbe 
corpus 
after a 
tenecd to state 
response to suc:h 
a >vrit of habeas 
Petitioner. 
Clarence A. Linn, 
M. Mom-
for a writ of habeas 
an inmate of San Quentin, 
abor·tion, was sen-
by law." In 
~we issued an order to show c:ause 
slwuld not be 
Petitioner was to on 1957, 
and has no1v served 18 Tnonths. I)ctiiioncr contends that his 
maximum sentenc:e should have been one year in the county 
The substantive ofJ'ense o£ abortion ''is by im-
less than l1co nor more 
crime, but fails, or 
petration is whrre 
by law for the punishment of such 
"1. [ Offens.e punishable by more than 
added.) 
'' [ l 'UXISHJ\IENTS 
to commit any 
in the per-
is made 
as follows: 
years in state 
Dec. IN RE BANDMANN 391 
[51 C.2d 388; P.2d 339] 
~·] If the offense so 
ment in the state 
the person guilty of 
ment in the not more than one year." 
The only involved here is whether subdivision 
1 or subdivision 2 of 664 when there has been 
an attempt to commit the crime of abortion. If subdivision 2 
applies, has served in state 
maximum term under that 
year in the county jail ; if subdivision 1 is 
has served 18 months of a 30 months and is 
in the state 
eonstruetion of the 
The solution to the lies in the 
found in section 274 of the Penal 
Code where the substaniiYe offense of abortion is stated to be 
punishable not "more than five years." It will be 
noted that subdivision 1 of section 664 of the Penal Code 
(Deering) is entitled ''Offense more than five 
years in state ."If the of the subdivision used the 
same language it ·would be obYious that is eorrect 
in his eontention. however, is not the sinee the 
language used there diffrrs in that the words used there are 
"for fi've years, or more." This court held in In 1·e Lee, 
177 Cal. 693 [171 P. that "It has been 
held that the indeterminate sentenre is in effeet a sentenee 
for the maximum term. It is on this basis that such sentences 
have been held to be certain and and therefore not 
void for uneertainty." It follows from this that the maxi-
mum sentence for the erime of abortion is five years, and the 
for to commit abortion would be two 
of this title will he discussed herein, it is 
found in Penal 
title 
·[This emphasis added. 
392 IN RE BAND?.fANN [51 C.2d 
and a half years in the state In People v. Superior 
116 414, 41G [2 P.2d 843], it was held that 
subdivision of seetion 664 provided for punishment for an 
to eommit a substantive crime at one-half of the 
for the crime itself. (See 
59 Cal. 423.) On the other hand the 
used in the title and body of subdivision 2 of seetion 
in that if the offense is punishable by "less 
years" or the is "for any term less than 
years" the person guilty of an attempt is to be imprisoned 
in the county ''for not more than one year.'' 
This court held in Los Angeles School Dist. v. 
200 Ca1. 637,641 P. 570], that "'l'he authorities are 
numerous to the cffeet that the title of an act may be relied on 
in the intention of the legislature, >Yhere the act 
; but the title 'eannot be used for the pur-
or eontrolling any of the 
v. 16 Cal. 359, 366; Barnes v. Jones, 
306; In the Matter the Boston M. & M. Co., 
626.) There is no ambiguity iu the amendatory 
and its title may not, therefore, be employed to 
eonlrol the provisions thereof." (See also IT eron v. 
209 CaL 507, 510, 511 [289 P. 160].) [4] It is appar-
ent from the body of subdivision 1 of section 664 of the Penal 
Code that its are uuambiguous if the title thereof 
is as it must he sinee it is merely an editorial one. 
It is plainly stated that if the offense so attempted is punish-
able in the state prison five years or more 
that the person guilty of such an attempt is punishable by 
·1::>\HLmt:uL in the state prison, or in a county jail, as the 
for a term not exceeding one-half the longest 
prescribed upon a eonvietion of the 
Sub<livision 2 of section 664 of the Penal 
Code makes provision for punishment of those guilty of 
attempts to commit erimes where the suh;:;tautivc offense is 
in the state prison "for any ienn less than five 
yectrs." From a c-areful reading of the two sPction;:; it is 
obvious that the Legislature inten<Jed that a erime l~arrying 
a five year maximum sentence should eonstitutt> the dividing 
line. In other if the substantive offense ear-ries a maxi-
mum of five years or more, subdivision 1 is appli-
cable; if the :mbstantive offense em·ries a maximum penalty 
of les;:; than fiye years, subdivision 2 is applicable. 
[5] In disregarding the title of subdivision 1 of section 
393 
C.2d 388; 333 P.2d 339] 
~----~~~----------
and looking only to the plain provi-
in thereof, subdivisions 1 and 2 are 
and harmonious. [6a] We said in v. JJfo-
rowy, 24 Cal.2d 643 [150 P.2d , tlwt "the 
cardinal of statutory construction" was that " 'a statute 
be read and considered as a whole, in order that the 
intention may be determined. All the parts 
he construed together, and harmonized, so 
to do so without doing violence to the 
and purpose of the act, so that the 
may stand in its entirety. For the purpose of har-
confiicting clauses, each should he read 
with direct r0ferrnce to every other which relates to the same 
and so read, if possible, as to avoid repugnancy.' " 
[7] \V e also said that "In cases of conflict between the 
of the same statute, those susceptible of only one 
will control those susceptible of two if the statute can 
thereby be made harmonious." If we were to construe the 
two subdivisions of section 664 as contended by petitioner, we 
would have a hiatus at the five year mark since subdivision 1 
would thPn provide for punishment for attempts where tl1e 
maximum for the substantive offense was more than 
five years with subdidsion 2 providing for punishment for 
attempts where the maximum penalty for the substantive of-
fense was less than five years. [6b] "The act must he con-
sidered and in all of its parts, and each section must 
reeonciled >vith the othrrs and be made effective if possible." 
d'; Co. Y. 21 Cal.2d 253, 260 [131 P.2d 
v. Triebcr, 28 Cal.2d 657, 661 [171 P.2d 
1]; In re 12 Cal.2d 579, 583 [86 P.2d 343].) 
Petitioner argues that subdivision 2 of section 664 was held 
l"""a'''"c to attempted abortion in People v. Bowlby, 135 Cal. 
519 [287 P.2d 547, 53 A.IJ.R.2d 1147]. In the Bowlby 
case the defendant was convieted of abortion and of attempted 
abortion. He was sentenced to one year in the county jail on 
the abortion count. Although the court afi1rmed the 
of conviction there was no discussion of the point 
and the case cannot be considered authority for 
urged by petitioner that subdiYision 2 of 
section 664 is applicable to attempted abortion convictions. 
[8] In view of the clear wording found in the body of 
subdivi:;ions 1 m1d 2 of section 664 of the Penal Code there 
is no merit to contention that said statute iR 
clearly ambiguous requiring a construetion that subdivision 
years'' jn 
five years. In the convicted 
of and was sentenced to serve 
seven and one-half years which the court noted was "one half 
of the term for a convic-
tion of the offeHse so " Petitioner there contended 
that subdivision 2 of section 664 of the Penal Code was ap-
'l'his court d(•nied a of 
corpus after of section 
664, stated: ''In 
obviously 
convicted of attempts to commit certain crimes. The first class 
(provided for in Subdivision 1) embraces those eases ;vhere 
the offense for five 
the absence of another 
son who is eonvieted of an 
offense when 
and the 
2) embraces those 
State Prison for a term less than five years, b1d which can not 
exceed or extend to that period, is 
ment in the county for not more than one year; and that 
every person who is eonvietcd of an to commit an 
whid1 offense when nn-
prisomnent in the State Prison for five years" or mm'c, pun-
ishable in the State Prison for a term not 
exceeding one half the pre-
scribed upon a convietion of the offense so 
phasis added.) of course, relies on the italicized 
words as authority for his that the term pre-
Dec. 1958] IN RE BANDMANN 395 
which is "nor 
means that the term cannot ex-
And since, in 
offense, the 
much in the one case 
unreasonable to suppose that it intruded 
punishment for an to commit 
an attempt to commit the other, IYhieh would 
of the construction contended for the peti-
tioner. At all the does not, in our 
admit of that construction." Inasmuch as the peti-
tioner in the case had been convicted of attempted 
first any statement there made con-
for attempted second degree burglary 
disapproved. 
Petitioner also relies on In re Bellis, 75 Cal.App. 146, 
P. 910]. 'l'he there was found guilty of 
The court, after noting 
was punishable by not less 
years and that second burglary was punish-
not less than one nor more than 15 years, held: "An 
sentence is in legal effect a sentence for the 
maximum term. (In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690 [171 P. 958].) The 
erimc of whic-h pleaded being punishable for 
than 15 years, one-half of the 
years ancl the crime there-
in the state " Peti-
maximum sentence for the sub-
the provisions of 
without merit. The provisions of 
very to the effect that it is the maxi-
mum term of the substantive offense which is the guide in 
396 IN RE BANDMANN [51 C.2d 
determining the punishment for an attempt to commit the 
substantive offense. Any intimation to the in the 
Bellis case is hereby disapproved. v. 123 CaL 
33, 35 [10 P.2d 767], whieh quotes the italicized 
in the Bellis case, is also in that it eon-
veys the inferenee that one-half of the maximum sentence 
the substantive offense is the in ap-
of section 664 of the Penal Code. It should be here 
noted that these cases correctly applied the law to 
there involved and the statements which we here 
were dearly dictum and had no bearing on the result reached 
in those cases. 
[11] Petitioner also contends that he has been denied 
due process of law and the equal protection of the laws because 
of the ''vagueness'' of the provisions of section 664 of the 
Penal Code. vVhen the two subdivisions are considered and 
construed together, as we have done here, it is obvious that 
the language used is neither vague nor ambiguous. [12] Fur-
thermore, even if the section has been misconstrued and mis-
applied in the past due to the misleading editorial title 
page 391), petitionrr eannot of an 
error which did not affect him and where the section was 
properly applied as to him. 
[13] Petitioner contends that he was improperly sentenced 
to prison under section 274 of the Penal Code (abortion) 
whereas attempted abortion is punishable only under section 
664 of the same code. The "Abstract of Judgment," 
tioncr 's Exhibit ''A,'' recites that he was convicted, on his 
plea of guilty, of "the crime of Felony, Attempted Abortion 
(a lesser and included offense), . . . in violation of section 
27 4 Penal Code .... " In People v. Berger, 131 Cal.App.2d 
127, 129 [280 P.2d 136], it was held that an attempt to commit 
abortion falls within the provisions of section 664 of the 
Penal Code. \Vhile it does not appear that the judgment is 
fatally defective, even if it were, it does not mean that 
tioner would be entitled to discharge. It was held in In re 
Fritz, 179 Cal. 415, 416 [177 P. 157], that such offe11ders 
"should be returned to the court in which had 
been convicted, for the imposition of a proper sen tenee." 
It has been brought to our attention that 
released on parole to Charles R. Bradley, a Sonoma 
parole offieer on or about August 18, 1958, and that he is no 
longer in actual physical custody in San Quentin. [14] As a 
prisoner upon parole, petitioner is constructively a prisoner 
397 
and under the control 
of' Corrections. (In re 25 Cal.2d 
[15] Such release does not render this 
reasons hereinabove set forth, the order to show 
cause heretofore issued the writ of habeas corpus 
denied remanded. 
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., con-
Dissenting.-It is the established rule that 
which is reasonably susceptible of two con-
structions is used in a penal law ordinarily that construction 
which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted." 
v. Stuart (1956), 47 Cal.2d 167, 175 [302 P.2d 5, 
55 A.L.R.2d 705]; People v. Smith (1955), 44 Cal.2d 77, 79 
P.2d ; In 1·c Bramble (1947), 31 Cal.2d 43, 51 
7] P.2d 41 ] ; In re JlicVickers (1946), 29 Cal.2d 
278 76 P.2d 40]; Prcoplc v. Valentine (1946), 28 Cal.2d 121, 
143 [20] [169 P.2d 1]; People v. Ralph (1944), 24 Cal.2d 
575, 581 [150 P.2d 401].) As further declared in People 
v. Ralph (1944), snpra, "eriminal statutes will not be built up 
' judicial upon legislation. . . . [I] t is also true 
that the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable 
doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the 
true of words or the construction of 
used in a statute.' [Citations.] " 
these principles in this case, any ambiguity in the 
statute here involved should be resolved in petitioner's favor, 
and the holding should be that he has already served the full 
maximum term for his offense of attempted abortion. 
So far as here material the pertinent statute, section 664 of 
the Penal Code, provides (subdivision 1) one punishment 
where the offense attempted ''is punishable by imprisonment 
in the state prison for five years, or rnore," and (subdivision 
a substantially lesser punishment for the attempt where 
the offense attempted "is punishable by imprisonment in the 
state prison for any term less than five years."1 (Italies 
added.) It seems to me that the legislative intent, as defined 
the language nsed, thus places the turning point on the 
'Ahortion, the offense here attempted, "is punishable by imprisonment 
in the state prison not less than two nor more than five years.'' (Pen. 
Code, § 27 4.) 
59 Cal. 423.) 
for any 
ishable ''for five years, or more.'' 
it is not for some or any than 
:five years' duration. 'fhus the atten1pt to eommit the offense 
plainly does not fall within the of 
the more severe 
tempted is for more than five 
years. 
It follows that the crime to 'Which 
(attempted abortion) doc>s fal1 within 
the lesser 
moee than one 
year's should he 
discharged. 2 
conc·urTed. 
quent sentenec 
criminal act or acts.'' 
